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It is not enough to have no concept,
one must also be capable of expressing it.1
Karl Kraus, in Die Fackel 697, 60 (1925)
But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to
reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds
concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense
do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we
are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and
grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate
mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism
George Berkeley, in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)
I. MOTIVATION
In what follows, the term context refers to a maximal collection of co-measurable observables
“bundled together” to form a “quasi-classical mini-universe” within some “larger” nonclassical
structure. Similarly, the contexts of an observable are often defined as maximal collections of
mutually co-measurable (compatible) observables which are measured or at least could in principle
be measured alongside of this observable [1, 2, 3, 4]. Quantum mechanically, this amounts to a
formalization of contexts by Boolean subalgebras of Hilbert lattices [5, 6], or equivalently, to
maximal operators (e.g., Ref. [7, Sec. II.10, p. 90], English translation in Ref. [8, p. 173], Ref. [9,
§ 2], Ref. [10, pp. 227,228], and Ref. [11, § 84]).
In classical physics, contexts are rather unrevealing, as all classical observables are in principle
co-measurable, and there is only a single context which comprises the entirety of observables.
Indeed, that two or more observables may not be co-measurable; i.e., operationally obtainable
simultaneously, and thus may belong to different, distinct contexts, did not bother the classical
mind until around 1920. This situation has changed dramatically with the emergence of quantum
mechanics, and in particular with the discovery of complementarity and value indefiniteness. Con-
texts are the building blocks of quantum logics; i.e., the pastings of a continuity of contexts form
1 Es genu¨gt nicht, keinen Gedanken zu haben: man muß ihn auch ausdru¨cken ko¨nnen.
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the Hilbert lattices.
We shall make use of algebraic formalizations, in particular logic. Quantum logic is about the
relations and operations among statements referring to the quantum world. As quantum physics
is an extension of classical physics, so is quantum logic an extension of classical logic. Classical
physics can be extended in many mindboggling, weird ways. The question as to why Nature
“prefers” the quantum mindboggling way over others appears most fascinating to the open mind.
Before understanding some of the issues, one has to review classical as well as quantum logic and
some of its doubles.
Logic will be expressed as algebra. That is an approach which can be formalized. Other
approaches, such as the widely held opportunistic belief that something is true because it is useful
might also be applicable (for instance in acrimonious divorces), though less formalized. Some of
the material presented here has already been published elsewhere [12], in particular the partition
logic part [13], or the section on quantum probabilities [14]. Here we emphasize the importance
of the notion of context, which may serve as a unifying principle for all of the logics discussed.
II. CLASSICAL CONTEXTS
Logic is an ancient philosophical discipline. Its algebraization started in the mid-nineteenth
century with Boole’s Laws of Thought [15]. In what follows, Boole’s approach, in particular to
probability theory, is reviewed.
A. Boolean algebra
A Boolean algebra B is a set endowed with two binary operations ∧ (called “and”) and ∨
(called “or”), as well as a unary operation “ ′ ” (called “complement” or “negation”). It also con-
tains two elements 1 (called “true”) and 0 (called “false”) satisfying associativity, commutativity,
the absorption law and distributivity. Every element has a unique complement.
A typical example of a Boolean algebra is set theory. The operations are identified with the set
theoretic intersection, union, and complement, respectively. The implication relation is identified
with the subset relation.
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B. Classical contexts as classical logics
A classical Boolean algebra is the representation of all possible “propositions” or “knowables.”
Every knowable can be combined with every other one by the standard logical operations “and”
and “or.” Operationally, all knowables are in principle knowable simultaneously. Stated differ-
ently: within the Boolean “universe,” the knowables are all consistently co-knowable. In this
sense, classical contexts coincide with the collection of all possible observables, which are ex-
pressed by Boolean algebras. Thus, classical contexts can be identified with the respective classi-
cal logics.
C. Classical probabilities
Classical probabilities and joint probabilities can be represented as points of a convex polytope
spanned by all possible “extreme cases” of the classical Boolean algebra; more formally: by all
two-valued measures on the Boolean algebra. Two-valued measures, also called dispersionless
measures or valuations, acquire only the values “0” and “1,” interpretable as falsity and truth,
respectively. If some events are independently measured, then their joint probability pq · · · can be
expressed as the product of their individual probabilities p, q, . . ..
The associated correlation polytope [16, 17, 18, 19, 20] (see also Refs. [21, 22, 23]) is spanned
by a convex combination of vertices, which are vectors of the form (p,q, . . . , pq, . . .), where the
components are the individual probabilities of independent events which take on the values 0 and
1, together with their joint probabilities, which are the products of the individual probabilities. The
polytope faces impose “inside–outside” distinctions. The associated inequalities must be obeyed
by all classical probability distributions; they are bounds on classical (joint) probabilities termed
“conditions of possible experience” by Boole [15, 24].
1. Two-event “1–1” case
Let us demonstrate the bounds on classical probabilities by the simplest nontrivial example of
two propositions; e.g.,
E ≡“a particle detector aligned along direction a clicks,” and
F ≡“a particle detector aligned along direction b clicks.”
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FIG. 1 Measurements of E1,E2,E3 on the “left,” and F1,F2,F3 on the “right” hand side, along directions θi.
E F E ∧F ≡ E ·F
1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 1 0 0
4 1 1 1
full facet inequality
1 pq≥ 0
2 p≥ pq
3 p≥ pq
4 pq≥ p+ q− 1
(a) (b)
TABLE I Construction of the correlation polytope for two events: (a) the four possible cases are represented
by the truth table, whose rows can be interpreted as three-dimensional vectors forming the vertices of the
correlation polytope; (b) the resulting four faces of the polytope are characterized by half-spaces which are
obtained by solving the hull problem. .
Consider also the joint proposition
E ∧F ≡ “the two particle detectors aligned along directions a and b click.”
The notation “1–1” alludes to the experimental setup, in which the two events are registered by
detectors located at two “adjacent sites.” For multiple direction measurements, see Fig. 1.
There exist four possible cases, enumerated in Table I(a). The correlation polytope in this
case is formed by interpreting the rows as vectors in three-dimensional vector space. Four cases,
interpretable as truth assignments or two-valued measures, correspond to the four vectors (0,0,0),
(0,1,0), (1,0,0), and (1,1,1). The correlation polytope for the probabilities p, q and the joint
probabilities pq of an occurrence of E, F , and both E&F
(p,q, pq) = κ1(0,0,0)+κ2(0,1,0)+κ3(1,0,0)+κ4(1,1,1) = (κ3 +κ4,κ2 +κ4,κ4)
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pq
FIG. 2 The correlation polytope for two events. The vertices are (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (1,0,0), and (1,1,1).
The four faces of the polytope are characterized by the inequalities in Table I(b).
is spanned by the convex sum κ1+κ2+κ3+κ4 = 1 of these four vectors, which thus are vertices of
the polytope. κi can be interpreted as the normalized weight for event i to occur. The configuration
is drawn in Figure 2.
By the Minkoswki-Weyl representation theorem (e.g, Ref. [25, p.29]), every convex polytope
has a dual (equivalent) description: either as the convex hull of its extreme points (vertices); or
as the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces. Such facets are given by linear inequalities,
which are obtained from the set of vertices by solving the so called hull problem. The inequalities
coincide with Boole’s “conditions of possible experience.” The hull problem is algorithmically
solvable but computationally hard [26].
In the above example, the “conditions of possible experience” are given by the inequalities
enumerated in Table Ib). One of their consequences are bounds on joint occurrences of events.
Suppose, for example, that the probability of a click in detector aligned along direction a is 0.9, and
the probability of a click in the second detector aligned along direction b is 0.7. Then inequality
4 forces us to accept that the probability that both detector register clicks cannot be smaller than
0.9+0.7−1 = 0.6. If, for instance, somebody comes up with a joint probability of 0.4, we would
know that this result is flawed, possibly by fundamental measurement errors, or by cheating, or by
(quantum) “magic.”
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E1 E2 F1 F2 E1F1 E1F2 E2F1 E2F2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
7 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
8 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
11 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
12 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
15 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE II Construction of the correlation polytope for four events. The 16 possible cases are represented
by the truth table, whose rows can be interpreted as eight-dimensional vectors forming the vertices of the
correlation polytope.
2. Four-event “2–2” case
A configuration discussed in quantum mechanics is one with four events grouped into two equal
parts E1,E2 and F1,F2. There are 24 different cases of occurrence or nonoccurrence of these four
events enumerated in Table II.
By solving the hull problem, one obtains a set of conditions of possible experience which
represent the bounds on classical probabilities enumerated in Table III. For historical reasons, the
bounds 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and 23-24 are called the Clauser-Horne inequalities [27, 28]. They
are equivalent (up to permutations of pi,qi), and are the only additional inequalities structurally
different from the two-event “1–1” case.
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full facet inequality inequality for p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 12
1 p1q1 ≥ 0 p1q1 ≥ 0
2 p1q2 ≥ 0 p1q2 ≥ 0
3 p2q1 ≥ 0 p2q1 ≥ 0
4 p2q2 ≥ 0 p2q2 ≥ 0
5 p1 ≥ p1q1 12 ≥ p1q1
6 p1 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p1q2
7 q1 ≥ p1q1 12 ≥ p1q1
8 q1 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p1q2
9 p2 ≥ p2q1 12 ≥ p2q1
10 p2 ≥ p2q2 12 ≥ p2q2
11 q2 ≥ p2q1 12 ≥ p2q1
12 q2 ≥ p1q2 12 ≥ p2q2
13 p1q1 ≥ p1 + q1− 1 p1q1 ≥ 0
14 p1q2 ≥ p1 + q2− 1 p1q2 ≥ 0
15 p2q1 ≥ p2 + q1− 1 p2q1 ≥ 0
16 p2q2 ≥ p2 + q2− 1 p2q2 ≥ 0
17 0≥ p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2− p1− q1 1≥+p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2
18 p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2− p1− q1 ≥−1 p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2 ≥ 0
19 0≥ p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2− p1− q2 1≥+p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2
20 p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2− p1− q2 ≥−1 p1q1 + p1q2− p2q1 + p2q2 ≥ 0
21 0≥ p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2− q1 1≥ p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2
22 p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2− q1 ≥−1 p1q1− p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2 ≥ 0
23 0≥−p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2− q2 1≥−p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2
24 −p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2− q2 ≥−1 −p1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1− p2q2 ≥ 0
TABLE III Construction of the correlation polytope for four events. The 24 faces of the polytope spanned
by the vertices corresponding to the rows enumerated in Table II. The bounds 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and
23-24 are the Clauser-Horne inequalities.
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3. Six event “3–3” case
A similar calculation [20] for six events E1,E2,E3,F1,F2,F3 depicted in Fig. 1 yields an ad-
ditional independent [29, 30] inequality for their probabilities p1, p2, p3,q1,q2,q3 and their joint
probabilities of the type
p1q1 + p2q2 + p1q3 + p2q1 + p2q2− p2q3 + p3q1− p3q2 ≤ p1 +2q1 +q2.
III. QUANTUM CONTEXTS
Omniscience in a classical sense is no longer possible for quantum systems. Some of the
reasons are: (i) quantum complementarity and, algebraically associated with it, the breakdown
of distributivity; (ii) the impossibility to consistently assign truth and falsity for all observables
simultaneously and, associated with it, the nonexistence of two-valued measures on even finite
subsets of Hilbert logics; and (iii) the alleged randomness of certain single outcomes.
A. Hilbert lattices as quantum logics
Quantum logic has been introduced by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann [7, 31, 32,
33, 34] in the thirties. They organized it top-down, starting from the Hilbert space formalism
of quantum mechanics. Certain entities of Hilbert spaces are identified with propositions, partial
order relations and lattice operations. These relations and operations are identified with the logical
implication relation and operations such as “and,” “or,” and the negation. Thereby, as we shall see,
the resulting logical structures are “nonclassical,” in particular ”nonboolean.”
Kochen and Specker [35, 36] suggested to consider only relations and operations among com-
patible, co-measurable observables; i.e., within Boolean subalgebras, which will be identified with
blocks and contexts of Hilbert lattices. Nevertheless, some of their theorems formally take into
account ensembles of contexts [9] for which a multitude of incompatible observables contribute.
If theoretical physics is assumed to be a faithful representation of our experience, such an
“empirical,” “operational” [37, 38, 39] logic derives its justification by the phenomena themselves.
In this sense, one of the main justifications for quantum logic is the construction of the logical and
algebraic order of events based on empirical findings.
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generic lattice order relation “meet” “join” “complement”
propositional implication disjunction conjunction negation
calculus → “and” ∧ “or” ∨ “not” ¬
“classical” lattice subset ⊂ intersection ∩ union ∪ complement
of subsets
of a set
Hilbert subspace intersection of closure of orthogonal
lattice relation subspaces ∩ linear subspace
⊂ span ⊕ ⊥
lattice of E1E2 = E1 E1E2 E1 +E2−E1E2 orthogonal
commuting projection
{noncommuting} { lim
n→∞(E1E2)
n}
projection
operators
TABLE IV Comparison of the identifications of lattice relations and operations for the lattices of subsets
of a set, for experimental propositional calculi, for Hilbert lattices, and for lattices of commuting projection
operators.
1. Definition
The dimensionality of the Hilbert space for a given quantum system depends on the number of
possible mutually exclusive outcomes. In the spin–12 case, for example, there are two outcomes
“up” and “down,” associated with spin state measurements along arbitrary directions. Thus, the
dimensionality of Hilbert space needs to be two.
Then the following identifications can be made. Table IV lists the identifications of relations of
operations of classical Boolean set-theoretic and quantum Hillbert lattice types.
• Any closed linear subspace of — or, equivalently, any projection operator on — a Hilbert space
corresponds to an elementary proposition. The elementary “true”–“false” proposition can
in English be spelled out explicitly as
“The physical system has a property corresponding to the associated closed linear
12
subspace.”
• The logical “and” operation is identified with the set theoretical intersection of two propositions
“∩”; i.e., with the intersection of two subspaces. It is denoted by the symbol “∧”. So, for
two propositions p and q and their associated closed linear subspaces Mp and Mq,
Mp∧q = {x | x ∈Mp, x ∈Mq}.
• The logical “or” operation is identified with the closure of the linear span “⊕” of the subspaces
corresponding to the two propositions. It is denoted by the symbol “∨”. So, for two propo-
sitions p and q and their associated closed linear subspaces Mp and Mq,
Mp∨q =Mp⊕Mq = {x | x = αy+βz, α,β ∈ C, y ∈Mp, z ∈Mq}.
The symbol⊕ will used to indicate the closed linear subspace spanned by two vectors. That
is,
u⊕ v = {w | w = αu+βv, α,β ∈ C, u,v ∈ H}.
Notice that a vector of Hilbert space may be an element of Mp ⊕Mq without being an
element of either Mp or Mq, since Mp⊕Mq includes all the vectors in Mp∪Mq, as well
as all of their linear combinations (superpositions) and their limit vectors.
• The logical “not”-operation, or “negation” or “complement,” is identified with operation of
taking the orthogonal subspace “⊥”. It is denoted by the symbol “ ′ ”. In particular, for
a proposition p and its associated closed linear subspace Mp, the negation p′ is associated
with
Mp′ = {x | (x,y) = 0, y ∈Mp},
where (x,y) denotes the scalar product of x and y.
• The logical “implication” relation is identified with the set theoretical subset relation “⊂”. It is
denoted by the symbol “→”. So, for two propositions p and q and their associated closed
linear subspaces Mp and Mq,
p→ q⇐⇒Mp ⊂Mq.
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• A trivial statement which is always “true” is denoted by 1. It is represented by the entire Hilbert
space H. So,
M1 = H.
• An absurd statement which is always “false” is denoted by 0. It is represented by the zero vector
0. So,
M0 = 0.
2. Diagrammatical representation, blocks, complementarity
Propositional structures are often represented by Hasse and Greechie diagrams. A Hasse di-
agram is a convenient representation of the logical implication, as well as of the “and” and “or”
operations among propositions. Points “ • ” represent propositions. Propositions which are im-
plied by other ones are drawn higher than the other ones. Two propositions are connected by a
line if one implies the other. Atoms are propositions which “cover” the least element 0; i.e., they
lie “just above” 0 in a Hasse diagram of the partial order.
A much more compact representation of the propositional calculus can be given in terms of its
Greechie diagram [40]. In this representation, the emphasis is on Boolean subalgebras. Points
“ ◦ ” represent the atoms. If they belong to the same Boolean subalgebra, they are connected by
edges or smooth curves. The collection of all atoms and elements belonging to the same Boolean
subalgebra is called block; i.e., every block represents a Boolean subalgebra within a nonboolean
structure. The blocks can be joined or pasted together as follows.
• The tautologies of all blocks are identified.
• The absurdities of all blocks are identified.
• Identical elements in different blocks are identified.
• The logical and algebraic structures of all blocks remain intact.
This construction is often referred to as pasting construction. If the blocks are only pasted together
at the tautology and the absurdity, one calls the resulting logic a horizontal sum.
Every single block represents some “maximal collection of co-measurable observables” which
will be identified with some quantum context. Hilbert lattices can be thought of as the pasting of a
continuity of such blocks or contexts.
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Note that whereas all propositions within a given block or context are co-measurable; proposi-
tions belonging to different blocks are not. This latter feature is an expression of complementarity.
Thus from a strictly operational point of view, it makes no sense to speak of the “real physical ex-
istence” of different contexts, as knowledge of a single context makes impossible the measurement
of all the other ones.
Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR) type arguments [41] utilizing a configuration sketched in Fig. 1
claim to be able to infer two different contexts counterfactually. One context is measured on one
side of the setup, the other context on the other side of it. By the uniqueness property [6, 42]
of certain two-particle states, knowledge of a property of one particle entails the certainty that,
if this property were measured on the other particle as well, the outcome of the measurement
would be a unique function of the outcome of the measurement performed. This makes possible
the measurement of one context, as well as the simultaneous counterfactual inference of another,
mutual exclusive, context. Because, one could argue, although one has actually measured on one
side a different, incompatible context compared to the context measured on the other side, if on
both sides the same context would be measured, the outcomes on both sides would be uniquely
correlated. Hence measurement of one context per side is sufficient, for the outcome could be
counterfactually inferred on the other side.
As problematic as counterfactual physical reasoning may appear from an operational point of
view even for a two particle state, the simultaneous “counterfactual inference” of three or more
blocks or contexts fails because of the missing uniqueness property [42] of quantum states.
As a first example, we shall paste together observables of the spin one-half systems. We have
associated a propositional system
L(a) = {0,E,E ′,1},
corresponding to the outcomes of a measurement of the spin states along some arbitrary direction
a. If the spin states would be measured along a different spatial direction, say b 6=±a, an identical
propositional system
L(b) = {0,F,F ′,1}
would have resulted, with the propositions E and F explicitly expressed before. The two-
dimensional Hilbert space representation of this configuration is depicted in Figure 3.
L(a) and L(b) can be joined by pasting them together. In particular, we identify their tautolo-
gies and absurdities; i.e., 0 and 1. All the other propositions remain distinct. We then obtain a
15
✻✲
✒■
E
E ′
F ′F
FIG. 3 Two-dimensional configuration of spin 1/2 state measurements along two directions a and b.
0 = 1′
1 = E ∨E ′ = F ∨F ′
E ′ FE F ′
L(x) L(x)
E E ′ F F ′
L(x) L(x)
(a) (b)
FIG. 4 (a) Hasse diagram of the “Chinese lantern” form obtained by the pasting of two spin one-half propo-
sitional systems L(x) and L(x) which are nonco-measurable. The resulting logical structure is a modular
orthocomplemented lattice L(x)⊕ L(x) = MO2. The blocks (without 0,1) are indicated by dashed boxes.
(b) Greechie diagram of the configuration depicted in (a).
propositional structure
L(a)⊕L(b) = MO2
whose Hasse diagram is of the “Chinese lantern” form and is drawn in Figure 4(a). The corre-
sponding Greechie Diagram is drawn in Figure 4(b). Here, the “O” stands for orthocomplementa-
tion, expressing the fact that for every element there exists an orthogonal complement. The term
“M” stands for modularity; i.e., for all x→ b, x∨(a∧b) = (x∨a)∧b. The subscript “2” stands for
the pasting of two Boolean subalgebras 22. Since all possible directions a ∈R3 form a continuum,
the Hilbert lattice is a continuum of pastings of subalgebras of the form L(a).
The propositional system obtained is not a classical Boolean algebra, since the distributive laws
are not satisfied; i.e.,
F ∨ (E ∧E ′) ?= (F ∨E)∧ (F ∨E ′)
F ∨0 ?= 1∧1
F 6= 1,
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F ∧ (E ∨E ′) ?= (F ∧E)∨ (F ∧E ′)
F ∧1 ?= 0∨0
F 6= 0.
Notice that the expressions can be easily evaluated by using the Hasse diagram 4(a): For any
a,b, a∨b is just the least element which is connected by a and b; a∧b is just the highest element
connected to a and b. Intermediates which are not connected to both a and b do not count. That is,
a b
a ba∨b
a∧b
a∨b is called a least upper bound of a and b. a∧b is called a greatest lower bound of a and b.
MO2 is a specific example of an algebraic structure which is called a lattice. Any two elements
of a lattice have a least upper and a greatest lower bound satisfying the commutative, associative
and absorption laws.
Nondistributivity is the algebraic expression of nonclassicality, but what is the algebraic rea-
son for nondistributivity? It is, heuristically speaking, scarcity, the lack of necessary algebraic
elements to “fill up” all propositions necessary to obtain one and the same result in both ways as
expressed by the distributive law.
B. Quantum contexts as blocks
All that is operationally knowable for a given quantized system is a single block representing
co-measurable observables. Thus, single blocks or, in another terminology, maximal Boolean
subalgebras of Hilbert lattices, will be identified with quantum contexts. As Hilbert lattices are
pastings of a continuity of blocks or contexts, contexts are the building blocks of quantum logics.
A quantum context can equivalently be formalized by a single (nondegenerate) “maximal” self-
adjoint operator C, such that all commuting, compatible co-measurable observables are functions
thereof. (e.g., Ref. [7], Sec. II.10, p. 90, English translation p. 173; Ref. [9], § 2; Ref. [10],
pp. 227,228; Ref. [11], § 84). Note that mutually commuting opators have identical pairwise
orthogonal sets of eigenvectors (forming an orthonormal basis) which correspond to pairwise or-
thogonal projectors adding up to unity. The spectral decompositions of the mutually commuting
opators thus contain sums of identical pairwise orthogonal projectors.
Thus the “maximal” self-adjoint operator C has a spectral decomposition into some complete
set of orthogonal projectors Ei which correspond to elementary “yes”-“no” propositions in the
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Von Neumann-Birkhoff type sense [7, 31]. That is, C = ∑ni=1 ciEi with mutually different ci and
∑ni=1 Ei = I. In n dimensions, contexts can be viewed as n-pods spanned by the n orthogonal
vectors corresponding to the projectors E1,E2, · · · ,En. As there exist many such representations
with many different sets of coefficients ci, “maximal” operator are not unique.
An observable belonging to two or more contexts is called link observable. Contexts can thus
be depicted by Greechie diagrams [40], consisting of points which symbolize observables (rep-
resentable by the spans of vectors in n-dimensional Hilbert space). Any n points belonging to a
context; i.e., to a maximal set of co-measurable observables (representable as some orthonormal
basis of n-dimensional Hilbert space), are connected by smooth curves. Two smooth curves may
be crossing in common link observables. In three dimensions, smooth curves and the associated
points stand for tripods. Still another compact representation is in terms of Tkadlec diagrams [43],
in which points represent complete tripods and smooth curves represent single legs interconnecting
them.
In two dimensional Hilbert space, interlinked contexts do not exist, since every context is fixed
by the assumption of one property. The entire context is just this property, together with its nega-
tion, which corresponds to the orthogonal ray (which spans a one dimensional subspace) or pro-
jection associated with the ray corresponding to the property.
The simplest nontrivial configuration of interlinked contexts exists in three-dimensional Hilbert
space. Consider an arrangement of five observables A, B, C, D, K with two systems of operators
{A,B,C} and {D,K,A}, the contexts, which are interconnected by A. Within a context, the op-
erators commute and the associated observables are co-measurable. For two different contexts,
operators outside the link operators do not commute. A is a link observable. This propositional
structure (also known as L12) can be represented in three-dimensional Hilbert space by two tripods
with a single common leg. Fig. 5 depicts this configuration in three-dimensional real vector space,
as well as in the associated Greechie and Tkadlec diagrams. The operators B,C,A and D,K,A can
be identified with the projectors corresponding to the two bases
BB−C−A = {(1,0,0)T ,(0,1,0)T ,(0,0,1)T},
BD−K−A = {(cosϕ,sinϕ,0)T ,(−sinϕ,cosϕ,0)T ,(0,0,1)T},
(the superscript “T ” indicates transposition). Their matrix representation is the dyadic product of
every vector with itself.
Physically, the union of contexts {B,C,A} and {D,K,A} interlinked along A does not have any
direct operational meaning; only a single context can be measured along a single quantum at a
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FIG. 5 Three equivalent representations of the same geometric configuration: (a) Two tripods with a com-
mon leg; (b) Greechie (orthogonality) diagram: points stand for individual basis vectors, and orthogonal
tripods are drawn as smooth curves; (c) Tkadlec diagram: points represent complete tripods and smooth
curves represent single legs interconnecting them.
time; the other being irretrievably lost if no reconstruction of the original state is possible. Thus,
in a direct way, testing the value of observable A against different contexts {B,C,A} and {D,K,A}
is metaphysical.
It is, however, possible to counterfactually retrieve information about the two different contexts
of a single quantum indirectly by considering a singlet state |Ψ2〉= (1/
√
3)(|+−〉+ |−+〉−|00〉)
via the “explosion view” Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of argument depicted in Fig. 1. Since the
state is form invariant with respect to variations of the measurement angle and at the same time
satisfies the uniqueness property [42], one may retrieve the first context {B,C,A} from the first
quantum and the second context {D,K,A} from the second quantum. (This is a standard procedure
in Bell type arguments with two spin one-half quanta.)
More tightly interlinked contexts such as {A,B,C}− {C,D,E}− {E,F,A}, whose Greechie
diagram is a triangle with the edges A, C and E, or {A,B,C}−{C,D,E}−{E,F,G}−{G,H,A},
whose Greechie diagram is a quadrangle with the edges A, C, E and G, cannot be represented
in Hilbert space and thus have no realization in quantum logics. The five contexts {A,B,C}−
{C,D,E}−{E,F,G}−{G,H, I}−{I,J,A}whose Greechie diagrams is a pentagon with the edges
A, C, E, G and I have realizations in R3 [14].
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C. Probability theory
1. Kochen-Specker theorem
Quantum logics of Hilbert space dimension greater than two have not a single two-valued
state interpretable as consistent, overall truth assignment [44]. This is the gist of the beautiful
construction of Kochen and Specker [9]. For similar theorems, see Refs. [45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. As a
result of the nonexistence of two-valued states, the classical strategy to construct probabilities by
a convex combination of all two-valued states fails entirely.
One of the most compact and comprehensive versions of the Kochen-Specker proof by contra-
diction in three-dimensional Hilbert space R3 has been given by Peres [50]. (For other discussions,
see Refs. [4, 14, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57].) Peres’ version uses a 33-element set of lines with-
out a two-valued state. The direction vectors of these lines arise by all permutations of coordinates
from
(0,0,1), (0,±1,1), (0,±1,
√
2), and (±1,±1,
√
2).
These lines can be generated (by the “nor”-operation between nonorthogonal propositions) by the
three lines [14]
(1,0,0), (1,1,0), (
√
2,1,1).
Note that as three arbitrary but mutually nonorthogonal lines generate a dense set of lines [58],
it can be expected that any such triple of lines (not just the one explicitly mentioned) generates a
finite set of lines which does not allow a two-valued probability measure.
The way it is defined, this set of lines is invariant under interchanges (permutations) of the
x1,x2 and x3 axes, and under a reversal of the direction of each of these axes. This symmetry prop-
erty allows us to assign the probability measure 1 to some of the rays without loss of generality.
Assignment of probability measure 0 to these rays would be equivalent to renaming the axes, or
reversing one of the axes.
The Greechie diagram of the Peres configuration is given in Figure 6 [14]. For simplicity,
24 points which belong to exactly one edge are omitted. The coordinates should be read as fol-
lows: ¯1→−1 and 2→√2; e.g., 1¯12 denotes Sp(1,−1,√2). Concentric circles indicate the (non
orthogonal) generators mentioned above.
Let us prove that there is no two-valued probability measure [14, 59]. Due to the symmetry
of the problem, we can choose a particular coordinate axis such that, without loss of generality,
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FIG. 6 Greechie diagram of a finite subset of the continuum of blocks or contexts embeddable in three-
dimensional real Hilbert space without a two-valued probability measure [14, Figure 9].
P(100) = 1. Furthermore, we may assume (case 1) that P(21¯1) = 1. It immediately follows that
P(001) = P(010) = P(102) = P(¯120) = 0. A second glance shows that P(20¯1) = 1, P(1¯12) =
P(112) = 0.
Let us now suppose (case 1a) that P(201) = 1. Then we obtain P(¯112) = P(¯1¯12) = 0. We are
forced to accept P(110) = P(1¯10) = 1 — a contradiction, since (110) and (1¯10) are orthogonal to
each other and lie on one edge.
Hence we have to assume (case 1b) that P(201) = 0. This gives immediately P(¯102) = 1 and
P(211)= 0. Since P(01¯1)= 0, we obtain P(2¯1¯1)= 1 and thus P(120)= 0. This requires P(2¯10)=
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1 and therefore P(12¯1) = P(121) = 0. Observe that P(210) = 1, and thus P(¯12¯1) = P(¯121) = 0.
In the following step, we notice that P(10¯1) = P(101) = 1 — a contradiction, since (101) and
(10¯1) are orthogonal to each other and lie on one edge.
Thus we are forced to assume (case 2) that P(2¯11) = 1. There is no third alternative, since
P(011) = 0 due to the orthogonality with (100). Now we can repeat the argument for case 1 in its
mirrored form.
The most compact way of deriving the Kochen-Specker theorem in four dimensions has been
given by Cabello [60, 61]. It is depicted in Fig. 7.
2. Gleason’s derivation of the Born rule
In view of the nonexistence of classical two-valued states on even finite superstructures of
blocks or contexts associated with quantized systems, one could still resort to classicality within
blocks or contexts. According to Gleason’s theorem, this is exactly the route, the “via regia,” to
the quantum probabilities, in particular to the Born rule.
According to the Born rule, the expectation value 〈A〉 of an observable A is the trace of ρA; i.e.,
〈A〉= tr(ρA). In particular, if A is a projector E corresponding to an elementary yes-no proposition
“the system has property Q,” then 〈E〉= tr(ρE) corresponds to the probability of that property Q
if the system is in state ρ. The equations ρ2 = ρ and tr(ρ2) = 1 are only valid for pure states,
because ρ is not an projector and thus idempotent for mixed states.
It is still possible to ascribe a certain degree of classical probabilistic behaviour to a quantum
logic by considering its block superstructure. Due to their Boolean algebra, blocks are “classical
mini-universes.” It is one of the mindboggling features of quantum logic that it can be decom-
posed into a pasting of blocks. Conversely, by a proper arrangement of “classical mini-universes,”
quantum Hilbert logics can be obtained. This theme is used in quantum probability theory, in par-
ticular by the Gleason and the Kochen-Specker theorems. In this sense, Gleason’s theorem can be
understood as the functional analytic generalization of the generation of all classical probability
distributions by a convex sum of the extreme cases.
Gleason’s theorem [55, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66] is a derivation of the Born rule from fundamental
assumptions about quantum probabilities, guided by the quasi–classical; i.e., Boolean, sub-parts
of quantum theory. Essentially, the main assumption required for Gleason’s theorem is that within
blocks or contexts, the quantum probabilities behave as classical probabilities; in particular the
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FIG. 7 Greechie diagram of a finite subset of the continuum of blocks or contexts embeddable in four-
dimensional real Hilbert space without a two-valued probability measure [60, 61]. The proof of the
Kochen-Specker theorem uses nine tightly interconnected contexts a = {A,B,C,D}, b = {D,E,F,G},
c = {G,H, I,J}, d = {J,K,L,M}, e = {M,N,O,P}, f = {P,Q,R,A}, g = {B, I,K,R}, h = {C,E,L,N},
i = {F,H,O,Q} consisting of the 18 projectors associated with the one dimensional subspaces spanned by
A = (0,0,1,−1), B = (1,−1,0,0), C = (1,1,−1,−1), D = (1,1,1,1), E = (1,−1,1,−1), F = (1,0,−1,0),
G = (0,1,0,−1), H = (1,0,1,0), I = (1,1,−1,1), J = (−1,1,1,1), K = (1,1,1,−1), L = (1,0,0,1),
M = (0,1,−1,0), N = (0,1,1,0), O = (0,0,0,1), P = (1,0,0,0), Q = (0,1,0,0), R = (0,0,1,1). (a)
Greechie diagram representing atoms by points, and contexts by maximal smooth, unbroken curves. (b)
Dual Tkadlec diagram representing contexts by filled points, and interconnected contexts are connected by
lines. (Duality means that points represent blocks and maximal smooth curves represent atoms.) Every
observable proposition occurs in exactly two contexts. Thus, in an enumeration of the four observable
propositions of each of the nine contexts, there appears to be an even number of true propositions. Yet, as
there is an odd number of contexts, there should be an odd number (actually nine) of true propositions.
sum of probabilities over a complete set of mutually exclusive events add up to unity. With these
quasi–classical provisos, Gleason proved that there is no alternative to the Born rule for Hilbert
spaces of dimension greater than two.
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D. Quantum violations of classical probability bounds
Due to the different form of quantum correlations, which formally is a consequence of the dif-
ferent way of defining quantum probabilities, the constraints on classical probabilities are violated
by quantum probabilities. Quantitatively, this can be investigated [67] by substituting the classical
probabilities by the quantum ones; i.e.,
p1 → q1(θ) = 12 [I2 +σ(θ)]⊗ I2,
p3 → q3(θ) = I2⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(θ)] ,
pi j → qi j(θ,θ′) = 12 [I2 +σ(θ)]⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(θ′)] ,
with σ(θ) =

 cosθ sinθ
sinθ −cosθ

, where θ is the relative measurement angle in the x–z-plane, and
the two particles propagate along the y-axis, as depicted in Fig. 1.
The quantum transformation associated with the Clauser-Horne inequality for the 2–2 case is
given by
O22(α,β,γ,δ) = q13(α,γ)+q14(α,δ)+q23(β,γ)−q24(β,δ)−q1(α)−q3(γ)
= 12 [I2 +σ(α)]⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(γ)]+ 12 [I2 +σ(α)]⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(δ)]
+12 [I2 +σ(β)]⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(γ)]− 12 [I2 +σ(β)]⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(δ)]
−12 [I2 +σ(α)]⊗ I2− I2⊗ 12 [I2 +σ(γ)] ,
where α, β, γ, δ denote the measurement angles lying in the x–z-plane: α and β for one particle, γ
and δ for the other one. The eigenvalues are
λ1,2,3,4(α,β,γ,δ) = 12
(±√1± sin(α−β)sin(γ−δ)−1)
yielding the maximum bound ‖O22‖ = maxi=1,2,3,4 λi. Note that for the particular choice
of parameters α = 0,β = 2θ,γ = θ,δ = 3θ adopted in [68, 69], one obtains |O22| =
1
2
{
[(3− cos4θ)/2]1/2−1
}
≤ 12
(√
2−1
)
, as compared to the classically allowed bound from
above 0.
E. Interpretations
The nonexistence of two-valued states on the set of quantum propositions (of greater than
two-dimensional Hilbert spaces) interpretable as truth assignments poses a great challenge for the
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interpretation of quantum logical propositions, relations and operations, as well as for quantum
mechanics in general. At stake is the meaning and physical co-existence of observables which are
not co-measurable. Several interpretations have been proposed, among them contextuality, as well
as the abandonment of classical omniscience and realism discussed below.
1. Contextuality
Contextuality abandons the context independence of measurement outcomes [1, 3, 4] by sup-
posing that it is wrong to assume (cf. Ref. [1], Sec. 5) that the result of an observation is indepen-
dent of what observables are measured alongside of it. Bell [1, Sec. 5] states that the
“. . . result of an observation may reasonably depend not only on the state of the system
. . . but also on the complete disposition of the apparatus.”
Note also Bohr’s remarks [2] about
“the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior of atomic objects and
the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions
under which the phenomena appear.”
Contextuality might be criticized as an attempt to maintain omniscience and omni-realism even
in view of a lack of consistently assignable truth values on quantum propositions. Omniscience or
omni-realism is the belief that
“all observables exist even without being experienced by any finite mind.”
Contextuality supposes that an
“observable exists without being experienced by any finite mind, but it may have
different values, depending on its context.”
So far, despite some claims to have measured contextuality, there is no direct experimen-
tal evidence. Some experimental findings inspired by Bell-type inequalities [70, 71, 72], the
Kochen-Specker theorem [73, 74] as well as the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger theorem [75] mea-
sure incompatible contexts one after another; i.e., temporally sequentially, and not simultaneously.
Hence, different contexts can only be measured on different particles. A more direct test of contex-
tuality might be an EPR configuration of two quanta in three-dimensional Hilbert space interlinked
in a single observable, as discussed above.
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2. Abandonment of classical omniscience
As has been pointed out already, contextuality might be criticized for its presumption of quan-
tum omniscience; in particular the supposition that a physical system, at least in principle, is
capable of “carrying” all answers to any classically retrievable question. This is true classically,
since the classical context is the entirety of observables. But it need not be true for other types
of (finite) systems or agents. Take for example, a refrigerator. If it is automated in a way to tell
you whether or not there is enough milk in it, it will be at a complete loss at answering a totally
different question, such as if there is enough oil in the engine of your car. It is a matter of everday
experience that not all agents are prepared to give answers to all perceivable questions.
Nevertheless, if one forces an agent to answer a question it is incapable to answer, the agent
might throw some sort of “fair coin” — if it is capable of doing so — and present random answers.
This scenario of a context mismatch between preparation and measurement is the basis of quantum
random number generators [76] which serve as a kind of “quantum random oracle” [77, 78]. It
should be kept in mind that randomness, at least algorithmically [79, 80, 81], does not come
“for free,” thus exhibiting an amazing capacity of single quanta to support random outcomes.
Alternatively, the unpredictable, erratic outcomes might, in the context translation [82] scenario,
be due to some stochasticity originating from the interaction with a “macroscopic” measurement
apparatus, and the undefined.
One interpretation of the impossibility to operationalize more than a single context is the aban-
donment of classical omniscience: in this view, whereas it might be meaningful theoretically and
formally to study the entirety of the context superstructure, only a single context operationally
exists. Note that, in a similar way as retrieving information from a quantized system, the only
information codable into a quantized system is given by a single block or context. If the block
contains n atoms corresponding to n possible measurement outcomes, then the information con-
tent is a nit [83, 84, 85]. The information needs not be “located” at a particular particle, as it can
be “distributed” over a multi–partite state. In this sense, the quantum system could be viewed as
a kind of (possibly nonlocal) programmable integrated circuit, such as a field programmable qate
array or an application specific integrated circuit.
Quantum observables make only sense when interpreted as a function of some context, formal-
ized by either some Boolean subalgebra or by the maximal operator. It is useless in this framework
to believe in the existence of a single isolated observable devoid of the context from which it is
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derived. In this holistic approach, isolated observables separated from its missing contexts do not
exist.
Likwise, it is wrong to assume that all observables which could in principle (“potentially”) have
been measured, also co-exist, irrespective of whether or not they have or could have been actually
measured. Realism in the sense of
“co-measurable entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite
mind” might still be assumed for a single context, in particular the one in which
the system was prepared.
3. Subjective idealism
Still another option is subjective idealism, denying the “existence” of observables which could
in principle (“potentially”) have been measured, but actually have not been measured: in this view,
it is wrong to assume that [86]
“entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind.”
Indeed, Bekeley states [87],
“For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any
relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse [[to
be]] is percepi [[to be perceived]], nor is it possible they should have any existence
out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”
With this assumption, the Bell, Kochen-Specker and Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger theorems and
similar have merely theoretical, formal relevance for physics, because they operate with unob-
servable physical “observables” and entities or with counterfactuals which are inferred rather than
measured.
IV. AUTOMATA AND GENERALIZED URN LOGIC
The following quasi–classical logics take up the notion of contexts as blocks representing
Boolean subalgebras and the pastings among them. They are quasi–classical, because unlike quan-
tum logics they possess sufficiently many two-valued states to allow embeddings into Boolean
algebras.
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A. Partition logic
The empirical logics (i.e., the propositional calculi) associated with the generalized urn models
suggested by Ron Wright [88, 89], and automaton logics (APL) [12, 90, 91, 92, 93] are equivalent
(cf. Refs. [12, p.145] and [13]) and can be subsumed by partition logics. The logical equivalence
of automaton models with generalized urn models suggests that these logics are more general and
“robust” with respect to changes of the particular model than could have been expected from the
particular instances of their first appearance.
Again the concept of context or block is very important here. Partition logics are formed
by pasting together contexts or blocks based on the partitions of a set of states. The contexts
themselves are derived from the input/output analysis of experiments.
B. Generalized urn models
A generalized urn model U = 〈U,C,L,Λ〉 is characterized as follows. Consider an ensemble of
balls with black background color. Printed on these balls are some color symbols from a symbolic
alphabet L. The colors are elements of a set of colors C. A particular ball type is associated with
a unique combination of mono-spectrally (no mixture of wavelength) colored symbols printed on
the black ball background. Let U be the set of ball types. We shall assume that every ball contains
just one single symbol per color. (Not all types of balls; i.e., not all color/symbol combinations,
may be present in the ensemble, though.)
Let |U | be the number of different types of balls, |C| be the number of different mono-spectral
colors, |L| be the number of different output symbols.
Consider the deterministic “output” or “lookup” function Λ(u,c) = v, u ∈ U , c ∈ C, v ∈ L,
which returns one symbol per ball type and color. One interpretation of this lookup function Λ is
as follows. Consider a set of |C| eyeglasses build from filters for the |C| different colors. Let us
assume that these mono-spectral filters are “perfect” in that they totally absorb light of all other
colors but a particular single one. In that way, every color can be associated with a particular
eyeglass and vice versa.
When a spectator looks at a particular ball through such an eyeglass, the only operationally rec-
ognizable symbol will be the one in the particular color which is transmitted through the eyeglass.
All other colors are absorbed, and the symbols printed in them will appear black and therefore
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cannot be differentiated from the black background. Hence the ball appears to carry a different
“message” or symbol, depending on the color at which it is viewed. This kind of “complementar-
ity” has been used for a demonstration of quantum cryptography [94].
An empirical logic can be constructed as follows. Consider the set of all ball types. With
respect to a particular colored eyeglass, this set disjointly “decays” or gets partitioned into those
ball types which can be separated by the particular color of the eyeglass. Every such partition
of ball types can then be identified with a Boolean algebra whose atoms are the elements of the
partition. A pasting of all of these Boolean algebras yields the empirical logic associated with the
particular urn model.
Consider, for the sake of demonstration, a single color and its associated partition of the set of
ball types (ball types within a given element of the partition cannot be differetiated by that color).
In the generalized urn model, an element a of this partition is a set of ball types which corresponds
to an elementary proposition
“the ball drawn from the urn is of the type contained in a.”
C. Automaton models
A (Mealy type) automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 is characterized by the set of states S, by the set
of input symbols I, and by the set of output symbols O. δ(s, i) = s′ and λ(s, i) = o, s,s′ ∈ S, i ∈ I
and o ∈ O represent the transition and the output functions, respectively. The restriction to Mealy
automata is for convenience only.
In the analysis of a state identification problem, a typical automaton experiment aims at an
operational determination of an unknown initial state by the input of some symbolic sequence
and the observation of the resulting output symbols. Every such input/output experiment results
in a state partition in the following way. Consider a particular automaton. Every experiment
on such an automaton which tries to solve the initial state problem is characterized by a set of
input/output symbols as a result of the possible input/output sequences for this experiment. Every
such distinct set of input/output symbols is associated with a set of initial automaton states which
would reproduce that sequence. This state set may contain one or more states, depending on
the ability of the experiment to separate different initial automaton states. A partitioning of the
automaton states is obtained if one considers a single input sequence and the variety of all possible
output sequences (given a particular automaton). Stated differently: given a set of inputs, the set
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of initial automaton states “break down” into disjoint subsets associated with the possible output
sequences. (All elements of a subset yield the same output on the same input.)
This partition can then be identified with a Boolean algebra, with the elements of the parti-
tion interpreted as atoms. By pasting the Boolean algebras of the “finest” partitions together one
obtains an empirical partition logic associated with the particular automaton. (The converse con-
struction is also possible, but not unique; see below.)
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that every experiment just deals with a single in-
put/output combination. That is, the finest partitions are reached already after the first symbol.
This does not impose any restriction on the partition logic, since given any particular automaton,
it is always possible to construct another automaton with exactly the same partition logic as the
first one with the above property.
More explicitly, given any partition logic, it is always possible to construct a corresponding
automaton with the following specification: associate with every element of the set of partitions a
single input symbol. Then take the partition with the highest number of elements and associate a
single output symbol with any element of this partition. (There are then sufficient output symbols
available for the other partitions as well.) Different partitions require different input symbols; one
input symbol per partition. The output function can then be defined by associating a single output
symbol per element of the partition (associated with a particular input symbol). Finally, choose a
transition function which completely looses the state information after only one transition; i.e., a
transition function which maps all automaton state into a single one.
A typical proposition in the automaton model refers to a partition element a containing automa-
ton states which cannot be distinguished by the analysis of the strings of input and output symbols;
i.e., it can be expressed by
“the automaton is initially in a state which is contained in a.”
D. Contexts
In the generalized urn model represent everything that is knowable by looking in only a sin-
gle color. For automata, this is equivalent to considering only a single string of input symbols.
Formally, this amounts to the identification of blocks with contexts, as in the quantum case.
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E. Proof of logical equivalence of automata and generalized urn models
From the definitions and constructions mentioned in the previous sections it is intuitively clear
that, with respect to the empirical logics, generalized urn models and finite automata models are
equivalent. Every logic associated with a generalized urn model can be interpreted as an automaton
partition logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton (actually an infinity thereof). Conversely,
any logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton can be interpreted as a logic associated with
some generalized urn model (an infinity thereof). We shall proof these claims by explicit construc-
tion. Essentially, the lookup function Λ and the output function λ will be identified. Again, the
restriction to Mealy automata is for convenience only. The considerations are robust with respect
to variations of finite input/output automata.
1. Direct construction of automaton models from generalized urn models
In order to define an APL associated with a Mealy automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 from a gener-
alized urn model U = 〈U,C,L,Λ〉, let u ∈U , c ∈C, v ∈ L, and s,s′ ∈ S, i ∈ I, o ∈ O, and assume
|U | = |S|, |C| = |I|, |L| = |O|. The following identifications can be made with the help of the
bijections tS, tI and tO:
tS(u) = s, tI(c) = i, tO(v) = o,
δ(s, i) = si for fixed si ∈ S and arbitrary s ∈ S, i ∈ I,
λ(s, i) = tO
(
Λ(t−1S (s), t
−1
I (i))
)
.
More generally, one could use equivalence classes instead of a bijection. Since the input-output
behavior is equivalent and the automaton transition function is trivially |L|-to-one, both entities
yield the same propositional calculus.
2. Direct construction of generalized urn models from automaton models
Conversely, consider an arbitrary Mealy automaton A = 〈S, I,O,δ,λ〉 and its associated propo-
sitional calculus APL.
Just as before, associate with every single automaton state s ∈ S a ball type u, associate with
every input symbol i ∈ I a unique color c, and associate with every output symbol o ∈ O a unique
symbol v; i.e., again |U |= |S|, |C|= |I|, |L|= |O|. The following identifications can be made with
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the help of the bijections τU ,τC and τL:
τU(s) = u, τC(i) = c, τL(o) = v, Λ(u,c) = τL(λ(τ−1U (u),τ−1C (c))).
A comparison yields
τ−1U = tS, τ
−1
C = tI, τ
−1
L = tO.
3. Schemes using dispersion-free states
Another equivalence scheme uses the fact that both automaton partition logics and the logic
of generalized urn models have a separating (indeed, full) set of dispersion-free states. Stated
differently, given a finite atomic logic with a separating set of states, then the enumeration of the
complete set of dispersion-free states enables the explicit construction of generalized urn models
and automaton logics whose logic corresponds to the original one.
This can be achieved by “inverting” the set of two-valued states as follows. (The method is
probably best understood by considering the examples below.) Let us start with an atomic logic
with a separating set of states.
(i) In the first step, every atom of this lattice is labeled by some natural number, starting from
“1” to “n”, where n stands for the number of lattice atoms. The set of atoms is denoted by
A = {1,2, . . . ,n}.
(ii) Then, all two-valued states of this lattice are labeled consecutively by natural numbers,
starting from “m1” to “mr”, where r stands for the number of two-valued states. The set of
states is denoted by M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mr}.
(iii) Now partitions are defined as follows. For every atom, a set is created whose members are
the numbers or “labels” of the two-valued states which are “true” or take on the value “1”
on this atom. More precisely, the elements pi(a) of the partition P j corresponding to some
atom a ∈ A are defined by
pi(a) = {k | mk(a) = 1, k ∈M} .
The partitions are obtained by taking the unions of all pi which belong to the same subal-
gebra P j. That the corresponding sets are indeed partitions follows from the properties of
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two-valued states: two-valued states (are “true” or) take on the value “1” on just one atom
per subalgebra and (“false” or) take on the value “0” on all other atoms of this subalgebra.
(iv) Let there be t partitions labeled by “1” through “t”. The partition logic is obtained by a
pasting of all partitions P j, 1≤ j ≤ t.
(v) In the following step, a corresponding generalized urn model or automaton model is ob-
tained from the partition logic just constructed.
(a) A generalized urn model is obtained by the following identifications (see also [88, p.
271]).
• Take as many ball types as there are two-valued states; i.e., r types of balls.
• Take as many colors as there are subalgebras or partitions; i.e., t colors.
• Take as many symbols as there are elements in the partition(s) with the maximal
number of elements; i.e., max1≤ j≤t |P j| ≤ n. To make the construction easier, we
may just take as many symbols as there are atoms; i.e., n symbols. (In some cases,
much less symbols will suffice). Label the symbols by vl . Finally, take r “generic”
balls with black background. Now associate with every measure a different ball
type. (There are r two-valued states, so there will be r ball types.)
• The ith ball type is painted by colored symbols as follows: Find the atoms for
which the ith two-valued state mi is 1. Then paint the symbol corresponding to
every such lattice atom on the ball, thereby choosing the color associated with the
subalgebra or partition the atom belongs to. If the atom belongs to more than one
subalgebra, then paint the same symbol in as many colors as there are partitions
or subalgebras the atom belongs to (one symbol per subalgebra).
This completes the construction.
(b) A Mealy automaton is obtained by the following identifications (see also [93, pp. 154–
155]).
• Take as many automaton states as there are two-valued states; i.e., r automaton
states.
• Take as many input symbols as there are subalgebras or partitions; i.e., t symbols.
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• Take as many output symbols as there are elements in the partition(s) with the
maximal number of elements (plus one additional auxiliary output symbol “∗”,
see below); i.e., max1≤ j≤t |P j| ≤ n+1.
• The output function is chosen to match the elements of the state partition corre-
sponding to some input symbol. Alternatively, let the lattice atom aq ∈ A must be
an atom of the subalgebra corresponding to the input il. Then one may choose an
output function such as
λ(mk, il) =


aq if mk(aq) = 1
∗ if mk(aq) = 0
with 1≤ k ≤ r and 1≤ l ≤ t. Here, the additional output symbol “∗” is needed.
• The transition function is r–to–1 (e.g., by δ(s, i) = s1, s,s1 ∈ S, i ∈ I), i.e., after
one input the information about the initial state is completely lost.
This completes the construction.
4. Example 1: The automaton partition logic L12
In what follows we shall illustrate the above constructions with a couple of examples. First,
consider the generalized urn model
〈{u1, . . . ,u5},{red,green},{1, . . . ,5},Λ〉
with Λ listed in Table V(a).
The associated Mealy automaton can be directly constructed as follows. Take tS = tO = id,
where id represents the identity function, and take tI(red) = 0 and tI(green) = 1, respectively.
Furthermore, fix a (five×two)-to-one transition function by δ(., .) = 1. The transition and output
tables are listed in Table V(b). Both empirical structures yield the same propositional logic L12
which is depicted in Fig. 5(b).
5. Example 2: The generalized urn logic L12
Let us start with an automaton whose transition and output tables are listed in Table V(b) and
indirectly construct a logically equivalent generalized urn model by using dispersion-free states.
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ball type red green
1 1 3
2 1 4
3 2 3
4 2 4
5 5 5
δ λ
state
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 3 4 5
(a) (b)
TABLE V (a) Ball types in Wright’s generalized urn model [89] (cf. also [12, p.143ff]). (b) Transition and
output table of an associated automaton model.
The first thing to do is to figure out all dispersion-free states of L12 depicted in Fig. 8 [see also
Fig. 5(b)]. There are five of them, which might be written in vector form; i.e., in lexicographic
order:
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5
m1 = ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 ),
m1 = ( 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 ),
m2 = ( 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 ),
m3 = ( 0, 1, 1, 0, 0 ),
m4 = ( 1, 0, 0, 1, 0 ),
m5 = ( 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 ).
Now define the following generalized urn model as follows. Note that the associated logic
contains two subalgebras with the atoms a1,a2,a5 and a3,a4,a5, respectively, which are interlinked
at a5. There are five two-valued measures corresponding to five ball types. They are colored
according to the coloring rules listed in Table VI.
For every single atom of the logic, one could just write down the set of numbers of the two-
valued measures (in some enumeration of all two-valued measures) which are 1 on that atom. For
L12, with the contexts defined by {a1,a2,a5} and {a3,a4,a5} and the measures defined above,
this construction is depicted in Fig. 8. Then, one chooses a single color per block, as well as the
symbols 1,2,3 indicating the atom. Now, generate as many ball types as there are blocks, and
paint one of the symbols “1,” “2” or “3” in the color associated with the elements of the partitions
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colors
c1 c2
ball type
“red” “green”
1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 5 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 5
2 ∗ 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 4 ∗
3 ∗ 2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗
4 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 4 ∗
5 1 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 ∗ ∗
TABLE VI Representation of the sign coloring scheme Λ. “∗” means no sign at all (black) for the corre-
sponding atom.
a4 = {2,4}
a3 = {3,5}
a5 = {1}
a2 = {2,3}
a1 = {4,5}
FIG. 8 Atoms are identified with the set of the numbers of two-valued measures which are 1 on that atom.
of the two-valued measures.
6. Example 3: generalized urn model of the Kochen-Specker “bug” logic
Another, less simple example, is a logic which is already mentioned by Kochen and Specker
[9] (this is a subgraph of their Γ1) whose automaton partition logic is depicted in Fig. 9. (It is
called “bug” by Professor Specker [95] because of the similar shape with a bug.) There are 14
dispersion-free states which are listed in Table VII(a). The associated generalized urn model is
listed in Table VII(b).
F. Probability theory
The probability theory of partition logics is based on a full set of state, allowing to define prob-
abilities via the convex sum of those states. This is essentially the same procedure as for classical
probabilities. In the same way, bounds on probabilities can be found through the computation of
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a3 = {10,11,12,13,14} a4 = {2,6,7,8} a5 = {1,3,4,5,9}
a2 = {4,5,6,7,8,9} a6 = {2,6,8,11,12,14}
a1 = {1,2,3} a7 = {7,10,13}
a13 =
{1,4,5,10,11,12}
a12 = {4,6,9,12,13,14} a8 = {3,5,8,9,11,14}
a11 = {5,7,8,10,11} a10 = {3,9,13,14} a9 = {1,2,4,6,12}
FIG. 9 Greechie diagram of automaton partition logic with a nonfull set of dispersion-free measures.
(a) lattice atoms (b) colors
mr and
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7
ball type
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 3
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 1
6 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
7 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 3 2
8 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
9 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 2 2 2 3
10 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
11 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 2 2 3 3 1
12 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1
13 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
14 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 3 2 2 2 2 3
TABLE VII (a) Dispersion-free states of the Kochen-Specker “bug” logic with 14 dispersion-free states
and (b) the associated generalized urn model (all blank entries “∗”have been omitted).
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the faces of correlation polytopes.
Consider, as an example, a logic already discussed. Its automaton partition logic is depicted in
Fig. 9. The correlation polytope of this lattice consists of 14 vertices listed in Table VII, where the
14 rows indicate the vertices corresponding to the 14 dispersion-free states. The columns represent
the partitioning of the automaton states. The solution of the hull problem yields the equalities
1 = P1 +P2 +P3 = P4 +P10 +P13,
1 = P1 +P2−P4 +P6 +P7 =−P2 +P4−P6 +P8−P10 +P12,
1 = P1 +P2−P4 +P6−P8 +P10 +P11,
0 = P1 +P2−P4−P5 =−P1−P2 +P4−P6 +P8 +P9.
The operational meaning of Pi = Pai is “the probability to find the automaton in state ai.” The
above equations are equivalent to all probabilistic conditions on the contexts (subalgebras) 1 =
P1 +P2 +P3 = P3 +P4 +P5 = P5 +P6 +P7 = P7 +P8 +P9 = P9 +P10 +P11 = P4 +P10 +P13.
Let us now turn to the joint probability case. Notice that formally it is possible to form a
statement such as a1∧ a13 (which would be true for measure number 1 and false otherwise), but
this is not operational on a single automaton, since no experiment can decide such a proposition
on a single automaton. Nevertheless, if one considers a “singlet state” of two automata which are
in an unknown yet identical initial state, then an expression such as a1 ∧ a13 makes operational
sense if property a1 is measured on the first automaton and property a13 on the second automaton.
Indeed, all joint probabilities ai∧a j∧ . . .an make sense for n-automaton singlets.
V. SUMMARY
Regarding contexts; i.e., the maximum collection of co-measurable observables, three differ-
ent cases have been discussed. The first, classical case, is characterized by omniscience. Within
the classical framework, all observables form a single context, and everything that is in principle
knowable is also knowable simultaneously. Classical probability can be based upon the convex
combinations of all two-valued states. Fig. 10 depicts a “mind map” representing the use of con-
texts to build up logics and construct probabilities.
In the generalized urn or automaton cases, if one sticks to the rules — that is, if one does not
view the object unfiltered or “screw the automaton box open” — omniscience is impossible and a
quasi–classical sort of complementarity emerges: depending on the color (or input string) chosen,
one obtains knowledge of a particular observable or context. All other contexts are hidden to the
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FIG. 10 “Mind map” representing the use of contexts to build up logics and construct probabilities.
experimenter unable to lift the bounds of one color filter or one input sequence. A system science
issue is emerging here; namely the question of how intrinsic observers perform inside of a given
system [93, 96]. The situation resembles quantum mechanics even more if reversible systems are
considered; where an experiment can be “undone” only by investing all the information gained
from previous experiments (without being able to copy these)[97, 98]. All incompatible blocks or
contexts are pasted together to form the partition logic. These pasting still allow a sufficient num-
ber of two-valued states for the construction of probabilities based upon the convex combinations
thereof.
In the quantum case, the Hilbert lattices can formally be thought of as pastings of a continuum
of blocks or contexts, but the mere assumption of the physical existence — albeit inaccessible to
an intrisic observer — of even a finite number of contexts yields a complete contradiction. In view
of this, one can adopt at least two interpretations: that an observable depends on its context; or
that more than one context for quantum systems has no operational meaning. The former view
has been mentioned by Bell (and also by Bohr to some degree), and can be subsumed by the
term “contextuality.” To the author, contextuality is the last resort of a realism which is inclined
to maintain “a sort of” classical omniscience, even in view of the Kochen-Specker and Bell-type
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theorems.
The latter viewpoint — that quantum systems do not encode more than a single context —
abandons omniscience, but needs to cope with the fact that it is indeed possible to measure different
contexts; even if there is a mismatch between the preparation and the measurement context. It has
been proposed that in these cases the measurement apparatus “translates” one context into the
other at the prize of randomizing the measurement result [82]. This context translation principle
could be tested by changing the measurement apparatus’ ability of translation.
All in all, contexts seem to be an exciting subject. The notion may become more useful and
relevant, as progress is made towards a better comprehension of the quantum world and its differ-
ences with respect to other classical and quasi–classical systems.
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